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I. INTRODUCTION
For a century-and-a-half, the Supreme Court has described perceived
abuses of patents as conduct that reaches “beyond the scope of the
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patent.”1 That phrase, which evokes an image of boundary lines in real
property, was applied to both government and private activity and came
to have many different meanings. Sometimes it was used offensively to
conclude that certain patent uses were unlawful because they extended
beyond the scope of the patent. Later it came to be used defensively as
well, to characterize activities as lawful if they did not extend beyond the
patent’s scope. In the first half of the twentieth century, this doctrine was
imported from patent law into antitrust law, where it has been widely used
to assess license agreements or other contracts involving patents, as well
as settlements of patent infringement lawsuits.2
The “scope of the patent” metaphor might remain useful for assessing
conduct thought to be inconsistent with patent law, which has a legitimate
concern with patent breadth. It is not a helpful tool for antitrust analysis,
however. Offensive antitrust use of the scope of the patent test often
identified practices as anticompetitive when they were in fact competitively
harmless. By contrast, defensive antitrust uses created an enclosure that
protected collusion or anticompetitive exclusion from antitrust scrutiny.
The result could be socially costly collusive arrangements that were more
profitable for the parties than the litigated solution, precisely because they
limited output or increased price excessively. The dissenters’ position in
the Supreme Court’s 2013 Actavis decision represents such a situation and
one where the majority rightfully rejected the scope of the patent test for
legality.3
II. ANTITRUST APPROACHES TO PATENT PRACTICES
Courts assess most antitrust practices under a “rule of reason,” which
requires them to estimate the defendant’s market power and the impact of
some practice that is claimed to be unreasonably collusive or exclusionary.
Antitrust law also recognizes a “per se” rule that is applied only to naked
restraints of trade—mainly price fixing, market division, and some boycotts,
all of which are addressed under section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 A practice
is “naked” if it is unrelated to any kind of collaborative activity with
efficiency-enhancing potential, such as joint production, joint research or

1. See infra, note 42 and accompanying text.
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 468, 476–77 (2015).
3. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231–32, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). On whether a per se rule survives for tying, see 9
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1720 (3d ed. 2011).
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technology sharing, or joint distribution. Whether some intermediate form of
“quick look” analysis exists is controversial, but there is no need for a
distinctive intermediate approach if proof burdens and presumptions
under the rule of reason are properly assigned.
Some antitrust challenges to patent practices involve unilateral exclusionary
conduct.5 Most are complaints about the competitive effects of various
collaborations or licensing agreements.6 Many of these are simply contracts
negotiated in the technology marketplace, while others are the outcome of
patent infringement litigation.
The existence of a license plus the licensee’s actual production indicates
that the firms are sharing technology. Absent other restraints, they are
very likely increasing output above what would occur without licensing.
This should indicate that a restraint is not naked but rather ancillary to
joint provision of some kind. For example, cross licensing in a large patent
pool is typically an effort to compete within a common technology, which
is often essential for achieving both competition and interoperability.
This is a common feature of markets for digital products.7 Other types of
patent licenses, such as those given to several local producers to make the
patentee’s product, are a form of vertical integration. They serve to establish
a dealership network for a common product, give dealers incentives to
promote the supplier’s product, eliminate double marginalization,8 or


5. E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
176–80 (1965) (bringing a counterclaim challenging infringement lawsuit on fraudulently
obtained patent); see 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 706 (4th ed. forthcoming 2015).
6. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2531689
[http://perma.cc/AJ7X-AD4U]. A few involve outright transfers. A patent is an asset and
is thus subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act, which forbids anticompetitive asset
acquisitions. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012); 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1202f (3d ed. 2009).
7. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, supra note 6.
8. Double marginalization—sometimes-called royalty stacking in the case of
intellectual property licenses—occurs when two firms supply complementary inputs to
some good, each has some market power, and they do not coordinate their pricing. In that
case, the sum of the prices charged by each will exceed their combined price if they were
a single entity or could coordinate. See 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 758 (4th ed. forthcoming 2015).
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simply take advantage of complementarities that technologies often provide.9
Such practices are typically procompetitive and thus are properly treated
under the rule of reason.10
A few agreements, such as the one at issue in the Supreme Court’s 2013
Actavis decision,11 are not ancillary to any kind of joint-production
activity or technology sharing. In Actavis, a firm with a patent essential
to manufacturing a product paid a rival to stay out of that market for a
specified period of time.12 There was no integration of production, sharing
of technology, or licensing. Outside the patent law context, such an
agreement would be unlawful per se and could even be a criminal violation.
As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision to apply the rule of reason must
have been driven exclusively by considerations of patent law.
Applying antitrust law to agreements involving patents raises several
issues. One is whether the practice falls completely within an express
authorization of the Patent Act. If so, then antitrust rarely has a place. The
rather general language of the antitrust laws yields to specific provisions of
the Patent Act. For example, the Patent Act authorizes a patentee, acting
unilaterally, to refuse to license its patent to others.13 As a result, a simple
refusal to license is not an antitrust violation.
In one situation, the antitrust laws are more specific than the Patent Act.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act forbids anticompetitive exclusive dealing or
tying of goods, “whether patented or unpatented.”14 While section 261 of
the Patent Act authorizes exclusive licenses,15 an exclusive license is not
the same thing as exclusive dealing. An exclusive license operates in
favor of the licensee, giving it the right to exclude other licensees of the
same patent. For example, a licensee who has an exclusive license for the
state of Nebraska can exclude others who attempt to practice that patent
in Nebraska. By contrast, exclusive dealing operates against the licensee,
forbidding it from purchasing and reselling competing goods. For example,

9. On these and other advantages of organized networks of independent dealers,
see 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1601, 1608, 1611–
19 (3d ed. 2010).
10. E.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
11. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
12. Id. at 2229.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012) (“No patent owner . . . shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . .
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent[.]”).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (patentee may “grant and convey
an exclusive right”).
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a dealer in Alpha’s patented product in Nebraska may be forbidden from
selling the product of Beta, a rival supplier. Because the Patent Act is silent
on exclusive dealing, the Clayton Act provision controls.
When a practice is not authorized by the Patent Act, general antitrust
provisions such as those contained in the Sherman Act should have relatively
free rein.16 This does not mean that practices that the Patent Act does not
authorize are unlawful under the antitrust laws, but only that antitrust is
free to impose the analysis it would ordinarily apply. There are good
reasons for this presumptive rule. First, the Patent Act reflects a long history
of producer control.17 When a statutory provision that reflects special
interest capture is ambiguous, sound interpretation requires construing the
statute against the interest group that has shown its ability to control the
process. If the courts get it wrong, the interest groups involved are in a
position to have it changed. If the statute is construed the other way,
however, it will probably never be changed.18 Historically, whenever courts
imposed either antitrust rules or rules about patent scope that were regarded
by patenting entities as overly restrictive, Congress amended the Patent
Act to counter them. For example, the 1952 Patent Act limited what had
come to be regarded as overly aggressive claims of patent “misuse.”19
Then again, in 1988, Congress made clear that unilateral refusals to license
were not unlawful misuse and that tying arrangements were unlawful only
if the defendant had market power in the tying product.20
Second, virtually all patent practices subject to antitrust analysis occur
after a patent has been issued. This includes both restricted and unrestricted
licensing, pooling, price fixing, and settlements of infringement suits. This
fact is important because the patent process is characterized by intense
government supervision during the patent application and prosecution
process, but almost no supervision at all once a patent has been issued.
Here, we can apply the same set of rules that generally govern antitrust

16. See infra text accompanying note 71.
17. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 191–205 (2015).
18. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 210–12 (2012); EINER
ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 12
(2008); Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567
(2006).
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
20. See id. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (enacted by Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988).
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analysis in regulated markets. When markets are intensely regulated and
a government official has reviewed and supervised the practice under
consideration, there is very little room for antitrust.21 As a result, antitrust
has virtually no role to play in the patent issuance process, not even for
the fraudulent or inequitable conduct of a patent applicant in obtaining a
patent. The patent system has ample legal authority and resources for policing
such conduct.22
Even antitrust’s Walker Process doctrine, which recognizes antitrust
liability for some improper infringement actions, pertains entirely too
post-issuance conduct.23 The gravamen of a Walker Process violation is
not obtaining a patent fraudulently. Rather, it lies in later enforcing
or threatening to enforce a patent that had been obtained fraudulently, by
inequitable conduct, or where a reasonable person in the patentee’s position
should have known that the patent was not enforceable.24 Once a patent has
issued, it is a personal property asset,25 and its use is largely in the discretion
of the patent owner. This makes antitrust an important instrument for dealing
with allegedly anticompetitive conduct involving issued patents.
Third, antitrust policy has a relatively robust, although certainly imperfect,
tradition of examining the economic effects of practices in the industry
where they occur. For example, in a challenge to exclusive dealing, a court
may consider market structure, the height and nature of entry barriers, the
duration of exclusive contracts, the availability of alternative distribution
mechanisms, and the like.26 In sharp contrast, patent law is almost completely
indifferent to market-specific factors that pertain to patent value and the
effects of patent practices. As a general proposition, it treats all markets
alike and has never developed useful tools for considering how or when a


21. See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 244b,
244c (4th ed. 2013).
22. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 706a.
23. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
176–80 (1965).
24. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 706; see also FMC Corp. v.
Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 & n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (distinguishing “mere
procurement” of a patent from subsequent enforcement: the former cannot be an antitrust
violation); Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that the procurement of a patent by fraud cannot establish an antitrust violation
absent evidence of any action toward enforcement of a patent).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
26. 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1820 (3d ed.
2012).

520

HOVENKAMP PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 515, 2015]

10/20/2015 2:42 PM

Scope of the Patent
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

particular practice furthers or restrains competition or, for that matter, even
when it furthers or restrains innovation.27
To be sure, factors such as high fixed costs, restricted entry, nonrivalry,
product differentiation, or information flow may play an important role in
predicting how a patent practice might affect competition or innovation.
The need for interconnectivity or product complementarity may also serve
to explain the value of joint innovation or information sharing. But these
are antitrust tools, derived from industrial organization economics. Patent
law has no equivalent tool set for assessing either the competitive or the
innovation effects of specific post-issuance patent practices.
The discussion that follows evaluates practices that are not expressly
authorized by the Patent Act and might be subjected to antitrust scrutiny.
It considers: (1) the significance of adversity between the parties to patent
settlements; (2) the scope of the patent test for patent and antitrust
practices favored by the dissenters in the Actavis pay-for-delay case, but
rejected by the majority; (3) the relevance of pre- versus post-issuance
patent conduct in determining antitrust immunity; and (4) proper application
of the rule of reason, considering burdens of proof, the relevance of less
restrictive alternatives, as well as why the antitrust analysis should usually
proceed without considering patent validity or scope (infringement).
III. PATENT SETTLEMENTS AND ADVERSITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Most lawsuits settle when each party has some prospect of winning or
losing. The settlement discounts these probabilities into a certain agreement
immediately rather than an uncertain outcome later. The classic patent
infringement lawsuit settled by a production license is a good example.
Under the settlement agreement, the infringement defendant becomes a
producing licensee. The relative strength of the infringement claim appears
mainly in the size of the agreed upon royalty, although it can also show
up in other provisions, such as the extent of geographical or other output
limitations. In general, the more likely the patent was valid and infringed,
the higher the royalty payment or the more restrictive the license terms
will be.28

27. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, supra note 2, at 496–504.
28. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Orgenus Pharma Inc., No. 09–3235, 2010 WL 4117157, at
*4 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010) (permitting discovery of previous settlements for antitrust
evaluation); Phoenix Sols. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 F.R.D. 568, 582–83 (N.D.
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One problem with pay-for-delay pharmaceutical patent infringement
suits that originate under the Hatch-Waxman Act is the way the statutory
structure limits adversity between the patentee and the generic infringer.
Under the Act, a generic firm commits patent infringement when it files
an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) for a biological equivalent
to a pioneer drug and the relevant patent has not yet expired.29 The
significance of the abbreviated application is that, because the drug is
bioequivalent to a drug that has already undergone comprehensive FDA
testing, most of that testing need not be repeated. At the time the generic
files its ANDA, the pioneer patent holder can either acquiesce and permit
the generic to produce or else can file a patent infringement action. The
Act provides that once the generic begins producing under this ANDA, it
will have a 180-day period of exclusivity, during which time no other
generics can enter the market.30
The Hatch-Waxman statutory mechanism contemplated that the generic
would begin production after pioneer acquiescence, or upon winning the
infringement lawsuit, or settling with a production license.31 However, if
the parties agree that the generic will delay entry for a specified period in
exchange for a payment from the patentee, production may not begin for
several years. The clock does not run on the generic exclusivity provision.
The parties are in a position to share the full returns available on a patent
that has now been placed beyond challenge by potential infringers.
When a payment-for-delay is possible, a settlement agreement on the
delay period does not reflect adversity between the parties. Both profit
from a longer delay. This is because prescription drug prices drop when
generic entry occurs, often quickly and dramatically.32 Prior to generic

Cal. 2008) (same); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting low royalty suggested weak patent).
29. Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), (5)(A)(iii) (2012).
30. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). The Supreme Court described the
process briefly in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228–29 (2013); see also 12
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046c (3d ed. 2012) (explaining the purpose of
the exclusivity period is to make generic entry more likely); C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A.
Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act,
77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 952 (2011) (discussing “paragraph IV” certification); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision,
15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 6–7 (2014) (same).
31. Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s
Actavis Decision, supra note 30, at 6–7.
32. See, e.g., Rena M. Conti & Ernst R. Berndt, Specialty Drug Prices and
Utilization After Loss of U.S. Patent Exclusivity, 2001–2007, at 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20016, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20016 [http://
perma.cc/N3RE-98M3]; Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the
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entry, the pioneer was setting its profit-maximizing output and price. The
parties could attain similar profits after generic entry occurs only by colluding.
The price and output set by a perfect cartel of an undifferentiated
product—such as bioequivalent drugs—is the same as the monopoly price
and output.33 But that would be unlawful per se. If the generic and
competitor do not fix prices, output will increase and prices will drop.34
While development costs for drugs are high, manufacturing costs are
relatively low, magnifying the extent of the price reduction. As a result,
price–cost margins are typically very high just prior to generic entry,
leaving a great deal of room for the parties operating under competitive
constraints to cut the price. In many of these cases, two or more generic
producers are waiting in the wings to compete. In such situations, the
incentive for an anticompetitive settlement is even larger than for a single
generic.35
Congress did not foresee that this situation creates an opportunity that
is well known in the history of collusion: sharing the monopoly profit is a
better outcome for the cartel players, no matter how little or how much
each of them produces. The only trick is to make the cartel legal. For
example, suppose that under the pioneer’s original monopoly its profits
are 100, while under generic entry the price will drop and the aggregate
profits of the two firms will go down to 60—say, 40 to the pioneer and 20
to the generic. Any output allocation that tends to preserve the 100 in

Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 76 (1997); Luke M. Olson
& Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on Generic Drug Prices
During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period 3–4 (Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Working Paper No. 317, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
estimating-effect-entry-generic-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J8AV-E5TS].
33. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 4.1 (5th ed. 2015).
34. Sometimes the price of the pioneer alone actually increases after generic entry,
but this is generally accompanied by a significant loss of market share by the pioneer.
That is, generic entry sometimes creates segmented markets in which a relatively small
group of people continue to pay a high price for the pioneer version, while the larger
balance of the market moves to the generic at a much lower price. See Henry Grabowski
et al., Recent Trends in Brand-name and Generic Drug Competition, 17 J. MED. ECON.
207, 212 (2013), http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/2575 [http://perma.cc/9LFY-UVAK]
(finding that for drugs in the studied sample, the pioneer retained only 16% of the market
one year after generic entry).
35. Aaron S. Edlin, et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 585, 603–10 (2015).
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profits can be profitable for both parties, including one in which the generic
firm produces nothing at all. For example, the pioneer might pay the
generic 30 to stay out of the market, retaining 70 to itself. The payment
that the generic receives is more profitable than anything it could reasonably
expect to earn by producing, and the pioneer is better off as well.36 This
outcome is no different than what would happen if a dominant firm bought
out its only rival and shut it down, except that in this case the duration of
the shutdown is limited. The history of cartels has seen instances when
cartel members have compensated one of those among them for a complete
shutdown.37
The cartel is especially profitable in the Hatch-Waxman pay-for-delay
situation because government regulation provides the entry barrier that
virtually guarantees its success. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, no one
else can challenge the patent in question until 180 days after the generic
begins producing, which under the settlement agreement could be several
years in the future—right up to the expiration date of the patent. If market
power is present, the parties will have achieved a cartel protected from
entry for the term set by the settlement agreement.
One reason adversity is missing in this setting is that the parties can
trade the size of the payment and the generic’s entry date against each
other—a larger payment to the generic in exchange for a later entry date.
As noted below, under the Actavis’ dissenters’ scope of the patent test, if
any date prior to patent expiration is within the scope of the patent, the


36. See Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., Generic Entry, Pay-for-Delay Settlements, and
the Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical Industry (Oct. 7, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481908 http://perma.cc/8TLM-APX9] (measuring
high value of pay-for-delay settlements). One important finding is that pioneer drug
makers value entry deterrence by roughly $4.6 billion, while generics value the right to
enter at about $236.8 million. Id. at 3. This provides enormous bargaining room for an
exclusion payment once the parties have come fairly close to an understanding about
patent value.
37. This is true because the cartel needs to reduce output, and the most profitable
output reduction gets rid of the highest cost output. As a result, it may be more profitable
to compensate a high cost member for shutting down than to retain part of its production.
For examples, see JEFFREY R. FEAR, ORGANIZING CONTROL: AUGUST THYSSEN AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 255 (2005) (describing such
shutdowns within German steel cartels); Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial
Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS’N 465, 482–83 (1887) (describing one such
incident in a grain elevator cartel); see also HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY,
supra note 33, § 4.1c (discussing the internal efficiencies of cartels).
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equilibrium entry point for the generic will be just at the patent’s expiration.38
That will maximize the value of the monopoly period and give the participants
the largest amount to share. By contrast, fixing the entry date without any
payments to the generic is more likely to preserve adversity and creates a
“less restrictive alternative” that can serve to validate the license agreement
under the antitrust laws.39
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE PATENT TEST—OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
Historically, the courts used the scope of the patent formulation as a
limiting device to restrict activities thought to reach beyond the statutory
authorization granted to the patentee. For example, nineteenth-century
decisions used such formulations when limiting retroactive statutory term
extensions as creating rights beyond the monopoly granted by an issued
patent.40 Patent law’s “first sale,” or exhaustion, doctrine used the same
concept. Adams v. Burke described a patentee’s attempt to control the use
of a patented good after it had been sold as asserting rights “no longer
within the limits of the monopoly.”41 The concept was later used to refer
to overly broad patent claim constructions as attempts to “enlarge a patent
beyond the scope of its claim.”42 In the first half of the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court used similar language repeatedly when discussing patent
tying arrangements or similar practices that were thought to extend the
patentee’s rights beyond the patent’s intended scope.43 The Court wrote

38. See infra text accompanying notes 65–66; see also Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis
and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, ANTITRUST SOURCE Oct. 2014, at 1, 5–6, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448530 [http://perma.cc/Z25P-J6B2].
39. See infra text accompanying note 106.
40. E.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548 (1852) (Taney, C.J.) (“[W]hen
the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the
monopoly.”).
41. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 460 (1873); see Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale
Restraints and Competitive Harm, 66 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 496–97 (2011).
42. Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 576 (1895).
43. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917) (determining that the tying of a patented projector to unpatented films was an
attempt to extend power “wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly.”); Carbice
Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (discussing tying of
patented ice box to unpatentable dry ice: “Control over the supply of such unpatented
material is beyond the scope of the patentee’s monopoly[.]”); Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665–66 (1944) (denying ability to “acquire a monopoly
which is not plainly within the terms of the grant”); see also Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224
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at some length on the beyond the scope formulation in its 1940 Ethyl
decision, holding that the patentee of a gasoline antiknock additive could
not use its sales agreements to specify the price at which the gasoline was
to be sold.44 Finally, in its 1964 Brulotte decision, the Supreme Court
condemned a patentee’s agreement requiring royalty payments after the
patent expired as an “effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent.”45
A. Defensive Uses
Beginning in the early twentieth century the scope of the patent doctrine
found a different, defensive use—mainly, that a patent settlement or other
licensing provision is lawful, even if facially anticompetitive, provided
that the agreement did not extend the patent monopoly beyond its lawful
scope. For example, in its 1902 Bement decision, the Supreme Court held
that product price fixing contained in a license agreement is lawful if it
does no more than “keep up the monopoly” granted by the patent.46 In
approving a product price fix in the controversial 1926 General Electric
case, the Court concluded that a patent licensee acts unlawfully only when
“he steps out of the scope of his patent rights.”47 The Court divided on the
issue in Line Material. The majority condemned a product price fixing
scheme contained in patent cross licenses and sublicenses. Three dissenting
Justices objected that the scheme did not reach “beyond the scope of the
statutory patent rights,” because a single patentee would have been legally
able to set the product price in any event.48

U.S. 1, 70 (1912) (White, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that tying of patented and unpatented
goods represented an attempt by the patentee “to increase the scope of the monopoly
granted by a patent.”).
44. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 455–59 (1940) (A price setting
clause expanded the defendant’s power beyond the “scope of the patent monopoly.”).
45. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). The decision has been widely
criticized. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §ௗ23.2 (2d ed. 2010 &
2014 Supp). Nevertheless, in 2015 the Supreme Court adhered to Brulotte on grounds of
stare decisis. Kimble v. Marvel Enterp., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1697 (2015). The Court paid
very little attention to the merits. Rather, it cited long-standing reliance by private parties,
in addition to the fact that Congress had many opportunities to overrule Brulotte statutorily
but had never done so. Id. at 2409–10. For further analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Brulotte’s Web, J. COMP. L & ECON. (2015) (forthcoming), currently available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2626758.
46. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902).
47. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926).
48. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 353 (1948) (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
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What the Line Material majority realized but the dissenters did not was
that a patentee always has the power to set the price of its own output, no
matter the strength or value of its patent. Stipulating the product price of
licensees, however, cartelizes any market that they might collectively
control. Further, the lawful cartel that results is more profitable to the
parties than competitive alternatives, thus limiting adversity among them.
As we shall see below, the scope of the patent test should never be used
to immunize behavior contractually imposed on someone else simply
because a patent owner could lawfully engage in that same business itself.
The defensive scope of the patent test regards the patent as a walled
garden whose contents are free from antitrust scrutiny, provided that the
challenged conduct stays inside the wall.49 A practice that reaches outside
is beyond the scope of the patent, but that does not necessarily mean that
it is an antitrust violation. Rather, the practice can then be subjected to
antitrust analysis.50 In Actavis, the dissenters would have applied the
scope of the patent test in this defensive way. Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that when a patent holder does anything, including entering a
settlement agreement, the “key” is that it “must act within the scope of the
patent. If its actions go beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the
patent, we have held that such actions are subject to antitrust scrutiny.”51
By contrast, the majority conceded that the competitor-exclusion agreement
at issue, which terminated prior to the patent’s expiration date, did not go
beyond the scope of the patent. Nevertheless, this fact did not “immunize
the agreement from antitrust attack.”52
As the tying, resale price maintenance, and product price fixing cases
indicate, the idea of scope of the patent can refer to things other than patent
duration. Patent ties were condemned, not because their duration extended
beyond patent expiration but rather because they were thought to represent
patentee overreaching, extending the patent to things or rights that the

49. This formulation owes a great deal to Ward S. Bowman, Jr., who posed the
antitrust question as, “Is more being monopolized than what the patent grants, or is the
practice merely maximizing the reward attributable to the . . . patent?” WARD S. BOWMAN,
JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 9 (1973).
50. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, supra note 2, at 520; see also
Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2012) (noting that the test assumes
away issues of validity or infringement).
51. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2239 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2230.
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patent did not properly include. For example, the Edison projector patent
monopoly did not extend to the unpatented films that were shown in it.53
Likewise, an agreement that purported to be a patent settlement but that
excluded a firm from some market not even arguably covered by the
patent would be an attempt to extend the patent beyond its scope. Some
pharmaceutical settlements have involved such claims.54
B. Scope of the Patent Under Vertical Integration
The scope of the patent rule is not nearly as unambiguous as the Actavis
dissenters believed. For example, when resale price maintenance (RPM)
was unlawful per se,55 the Supreme Court consistently condemned RPM
agreements contained in patent licenses.56 RPM agreements seem to fall
within the scope of the patent, however, because if the patentee sold the
goods directly to consumers itself, it could charge any price it pleased.
That outcome would be no different if it sold to a reseller but stipulated
the resale price. That was precisely the reasoning the Courts used to
uphold horizontal product price fixing in the Bement and GE cases
mentioned above.57
The scope of the patent rule becomes quite arbitrary when we compare
patent use by vertically integrated versus unintegrated firms. For example, a
vertically integrated patentee might engage in tying internally and stay
completely within the scope of the patent. Suppose that Edison Films
made movies and then invented and patented a superior projector for
showing them.58 It could lawfully refuse to license the projector to anyone
else, using it exclusively to show its own films.59 In that case, the projector
would be an upstream component in Edison’s process, and using it to show

53. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511–12
(1917).
54. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 6, FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 14-CV-5151 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140908abbviecmpt1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3VQZ-LG7S].
55. RPM was made unlawful per se by Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373, (1911), but was placed under the rule of reason in Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles).
56. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 253–54 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 452–53 (1940). The exception was when the dealers
were mere agents who did not take title, rather than resellers. E.g., United States v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 483–84 (1926).
57. See supra notes 46, 47 and accompanying text.
58. Cf. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917) (involving a patent tie).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012).
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its own films would clearly be within the scope of the patent. Section 3 of
the Clayton Act tracks this outcome, condemning anticompetitive patent
ties imposed on another firm by agreement, but not internal production
that uses two inputs together.60
By the same token, both Ethyl and Line Material, mentioned above,61
involved a practice—RPM of the product price—that a patentee could
lawfully have done had it made the entire product itself, using the patent
internally but refusing to license it to anyone else. They ran afoul of the
antitrust laws only because they licensed their product to others and then
stipulated the price that the licensees must charge. In Ethyl, the defendant
made an antiknock additive that was used in very small amounts in
gasoline, but when it sold the additive to refiners, it stipulated the price of
the gasoline itself.62 The Court found that this extension from the patented
additive to the gasoline went beyond the scope of the patent.63 If Ethyl
had purchased gasoline, added the additive, and then resold the gasoline
itself at any price it chose, it is difficult to find any basis for an antitrust
violation. That is, antitrust liability turned on which direction the product
moved in the marketplace.
The scope of the patent test, as the courts have interpreted it, apparently
means that a patentee may lawfully do something internally, such as using
two products together or setting a retail price, but that this same activity
steps outside of the scope of the patent as soon as the patentee attempts to
transfer part of the activity to someone else, even though the end result is
precisely the same. Under that reasoning, it is hardly clear that the payfor-delay settlement is within the scope of the patent. The patentee was
not merely manufacturing under its patent, but also paying a rival to stay
out of the market. There was no integration of distribution between the
parties, as there is in most tying or RPM cases, but that would cut against
rather than in favor of the practice.
To summarize: if a patentee refuses to license to others, then it is free
to practice its patent internally, set the product price on its own sales, produce

60. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). The doctrine of patent “misuse” was invented in tying
cases where the premise was that the patent was otherwise in force. See 10 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1781–82 (3d ed. 2011); Christina
Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 501 (2011).
61. See supra notes 44, 48.
62. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456–58 (1940).
63. Id. at 456–58.
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wherever and as much as it wants, use only its own complementary products,
and so on. Patent validity is not even an issue as long as the patentee does
not try to enforce the patent against others, and all of these activities fall
within the scope of the patent.
Further, a patentee who is currently charging $5.00 each for its patented
widgets might license another manufacturer only on the condition that this
manufacturer also charge $5.00 for the finished product. The Supreme
Court permitted this outcome when the restraint was horizontal, as in Bement
and GE, but not when it was vertical, as in Univis and Ethyl.64 That result
is perverse as a matter of antitrust policy, because it deals with a vertical
restraint more harshly than a horizontal one. It also exposes the scope of
the patent test as little more than easily manipulated rhetoric.
C. Scope of the Patent and Pay-for-Delay Equilibrium
In Actavis, the defendant was accused of violating the antitrust laws by
paying the patent infringement defendant to stay out of the market for a
period that was shorter than the remaining duration of the patent. Two
things are noteworthy about this agreement. First, if the patent were both
valid and infringed, then the pay-for-delay agreement would be no more
exclusionary than a judicial decision upholding the patent for its full term.
In this sense, the restraint was within the scope of the patent. Second,
however, paying a rival to stay out of one’s market without any kind of
license involving production or joint integration is a naked restraint on
trade, and a practice that is not authorized by any provision in the Patent
Act.
For the Actavis dissenters, the “precise terms of the grant define the
limits of a patentee’s monopoly and the area in which the patentee is freed
from competition.”65 Following other circuit courts, the Eleventh Circuit
had defined “scope” strictly in reference to patent duration, indicating that
a pay-for-delay settlement that kept the generic out indefinitely or for
some period beyond the patent’s expiration would be beyond the scope of
the patent.66 Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court also interpreted scope

64. Compare supra notes 46, 47 and accompanying text, with supra notes 56, 62–
63 and accompanying text.
65. FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (quoting United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 300 (1948)).
66. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1310–11, 1315 (11th Cir.
2012) (“[S]cope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” (quoting Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 (2003))); see also Ark. Carpenters Health and
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The question . . . is whether
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of the patent to refer to the patent’s duration.67 That is apparently what
Chief Justice Roberts meant as well, although his dissenting opinion was
not as explicit.68 Of course, the patentee in Actavis was not simply practicing
the patent for its duration and refusing to license; it was also paying
someone else not to challenge it in a legal environment that made it
impossible for anyone else to challenge the patent either.
Without a reverse payment, the litigating parties’ selection of settlement
options depends entirely on their assessment of the patent’s validity and
infringement. They should have complete adversity on this question. A
rock-solid patent would lead to a generic entry date close to the patent’s
expiration date, while a very weak patent would lead to a much earlier
expected entry date. If this expected entry date could be computed by a
third party, it could provide a tool for evaluating patent settlements that
include pay for delay: a settlement that permits generic entry at or prior to
the expected entry date would be procompetitive because it would be no
worse than the predicted, risk-adjusted outcome under litigation when no
payment is available.69

patent settlements in which the generic firm agrees to delay entry into the market in
exchange for payment fall within the scope of the patent holder’s property rights . . . .”);
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir.
2008), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. But see In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686
F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith
Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) (rejecting scope of the
patent test).
67. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (“[S]ince the alleged infringer’s promise not to
enter the patentee’s market expired before the patent’s term ended, the Circuit found the
agreement legal and dismissed the FTC complaint.” (citing FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc.,
677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (2012)).
68. See id. at 2240 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The European Commission recently
fined Lundbeck, Inc. for a pay-for-delay settlement that extended beyond the expiration
date of the patent. The public version of the decision is available at http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39226/39226_831011.pdf.
69. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391,
407–08 (2003) (on computing the expected entry date); see also Aaron Edlin, Scott
Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 16
(Fall 2013) (discussing large reverse payments as a key source of the inference); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1762 (2003) (“[A]n agreement to delay entry
likely reflects the parties’ joint assessment of the likely outcome of the litigation.”). Einer
Elhauge and Alex Kreuger speak of the “expected litigation exclusion period.” See Einer
Elhauge & Alex Kreuger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 284–
85 (2012). They conclude that the period runs around 27%–52% of the remaining patent
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Of course, courts do not compute expected entry dates based on variable
predictions of patent strength. Even in fully litigated patent infringement
lawsuits, their approach is binary, declaring a patent either valid or invalid.
Under the first, expected entry cannot occur until after the full patent term
ends; under the second, it can occur immediately. In responding to a
settlement, a court might set aside a patent settlement based on an obviously
deficient patent. Most of the time, however, it defers to the parties’ judgment,
presumably assuming that adversity between them will resolve most issues.
A realistic approach to anticompetitive patent settlements must take these
limitations on judicial power into account.
In the Hatch-Waxman context, the availability of reverse payments plus
third-party exclusion until 180 days after generic production seriously
diminishes adversity between the parties by giving them a common goal,
which is to maximize the overall size of the patent pie. Adversity remains
on the size of the reverse payment, which determines how the pie will be
divided.
This fact explains why the scope of the patent test advocated by the
Actavis dissenters can be so harmful to competition. That rule effectively
decides the size of the patent pie by presuming a 100% chance of patent
validity. A durational scope of the patent test for pay-for-delay settlements
creates a bargaining equilibrium equating the term of delay with the
remaining duration of the patent. The figure below illustrates:



term, by taking the inverse of statistics to show that patentees lose 48%–73% of HatchWaxman ANDA-generated patent litigation cases that are prosecuted to a judgment. As
the authors observe, the patents that yield high pay-for-delay settlements would be closer
to the 27% number. Id. at 287–88. Note, however, that the patents that are actually litigated
are very likely stronger than the ones that settle. On patentee success in such cases,
see ADAM GREENE & D. DEWEY STEADMAN, RBC CAPITAL MKTS., PHARMACEUTICALS:
ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 1 (2010); Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who
Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 20 (2006).
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Bracket A denotes the available margins, or the vertical distance
between production and distribution cost and price, during the period that
the patent is unchallenged. The horizontal lines extend from left to right
to measure time. Point B marks the date that the patent expires or is declared
invalid. The falling line to the right of B represents returns after entry by
a single generic begins. For the first 180 days, the market contains only
one generic and prices fall gradually to point C. After that, other generics
can enter, and prices are likely to fall much further, depending on the
extent of generic competition—often to 20% of pre-entry prices.70 This is
so because these drugs are by definition bioequivalent, meaning that they
are undifferentiated. In that case, competition drives prices toward marginal
cost.
The pioneer’s unilateral maximizing position is to assert its patent rights
all the way to point B, the date that the patent is no longer enforceable.
However, this is also the joint maximizing position of the patentee plus
the first generic.71 Further, maintaining monopoly markups all the way to
point B is typically worth significantly more to the pioneer than early
entry is to the generic, who will earn only its share of the post entry
duopoly returns.72 The joint maximizing arrangement for the two parties
is to delay the generic’s entry until point B. Any settlement that permitted
generic entry to occur earlier than that would not be joint maximizing.
For any arrangement that terminated prior to point B, the parties could
obtain more by extending the agreement further, all the way to the scope
of the patent trigger. This is simply an application of the Coase Theorem,

70. See United States, Generic Pharmaceuticals, at 2 (OECD submission, June 10,
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-internationalcompetition- fora/generics_us_oecd.pdf (updating statistics on pharmaceutical pricing in
the wake of generic entry); see also Steven Tenn & Brett W. Wendling, Entry Threats
and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 214, 216 (2014)
(comparing prices based on market size). On the impact of multiple, as opposed to single,
generic entry, see Aaron S. Edlin et al., supra note 35, at 603–16.
71. A perfect cartel has the same price and output as a monopolist. See HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 33, §§ 4.1–4.2.
72. On this point, see Jacobo-Rubio, et al., supra note 36, at 3, which finds that the
value to the pioneer of maintaining its exclusion over the life of the patent runs about
sixteen to twenty times higher than the value to the generic of being able to enter.
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under which the firms will reach a settlement that maximizes joint profits,
although the size of the transfer payment between them is indeterminate.73
In sum, if the Court had adopted a scope of the patent rule that
exonerated all pay-for-delay agreements that did not extend beyond the
patent’s term, a robust equilibrium for future agreements would extend
them right up to the expiration date of the patent. The only indeterminate
question would be the size of the payment, which would be a function of
the parties’ collective evaluation of the patent’s validity. If they perceived
that the patent was strong and infringed, the payment to the generic would
be relatively small. By contrast, if they perceived the patent was weak,
the payment would be large. Even for a very weak patent, however, the
parties would have no incentive to shorten the duration of the pay-for
delay agreement.
One consequence that should not be overlooked is that an equilibrium
pay-for-delay settlement under the Actavis dissenters’ scope-of-the-patent
test will never result in a production license. The equilibrium settlement
will delay generic entry up to the time that the patent expires, but after
that, the generic no longer needs a license to enter. The agreement is
nothing more than a naked market division.
D. Statutory Authorization and the Scope of the Patent
A more helpful understanding of the beyond the scope formulation
considers whether the practice in question was or was not authorized by
the Patent Act. In Line Material, the Supreme Court defined the “limits
of the patent monopoly” by observing that “[n]othing in the patent statute
specifically gives a right to fix the price at which a licensee may vend the
patented article.”74 The Actavis majority adopted this formulation. Justice
Breyer noted that nothing in the Patent Act authorized the pay-for-delay
scheme in question.75 Later, he observed that “[t]he dissent does not identify
any patent statute that it understands to grant such a right to a patentee,
whether expressly or by fair implication.”76
This alternative conception of beyond the scope is much more consistent
with the ordinary usage of that term. For example, while the scope of legal

73. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2–8 (1960).
74. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310–11 (1948) (citing 35
U.S.C. §§ 40, 47 (1946)).
75. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (quoting Line Material, 333
U.S. at 311).
76. Id. at 2233.
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rights flowing from real property ownership is substantial, it does not permit
murder or battery that occurs within the property’s boundaries. Rather,
the proper scope of property rights is determined by looking at a large body
of law in addition to the metes and bounds of a deed as determining what
the owner can and cannot do. The courts have also frequently spoken of
things not expressly covered by a statute as being beyond its scope.77
V. ANTITRUST IMMUNITY: PRE-VERSUS POST-ISSUANCE CONDUCT
The scope of the patent test for determining antitrust immunity reflects
an approach to antitrust in regulated industries that is no longer used. It
comes out of a period when regulatory law immunized everything that
was pervasively controlled by a regulatory authority. Once a court concluded
that an area was pervasively regulated, nearly everything within that particular
regulatory enterprise was regarded as immune from antitrust scrutiny.78
The patent system is a form of regulation and must be treated accordingly.
Today, we take a more finessed approach to antitrust problems in
regulated markets, querying whether the regulator actually authorized the
specific practice that is under antitrust scrutiny. This approach looks at
the particular conduct being challenged under the antitrust laws, rather
than providing a blanket exemption for everything inside the boundary
walls. As the Supreme Court has observed:
To be sure, where Congress did intend to repeal the antitrust laws, that intent
governs, . . . but this intent must be clear. Even when an industry is regulated
substantially, this does not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the antitrust
laws with respect to every action taken within the industry . . . . Intent to repeal
the antitrust laws is much clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered
to authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust challenge.79


77. E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000)
(holding that cigarette coverage is beyond the scope of Food and Drug Act); In re Placid
Oil Co., 753 F.3d 151, 158 n.7 (5th Cir. 2014) (ruling that a bankrupt’s claims extended
beyond the scope of statute); City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 2014 CO 7, ¶¶ 30, 50 (exemplifying
a debate by a divided court as to whether decision on entitlement to receive worker’s
compensation extended beyond the scope of the statute).
78. E.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 385 (1973);
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305 (1963); see 1A AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 244b.
79. Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389
(1981) (citations omitted).
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Or as the Court restated the issue in Trinko, the question is whether the
government’s oversight of the particular challenged practice made it an
“effective steward of the antitrust function.”80
In this respect, the patent law system divides the territory rather cleanly,
providing a great deal of government supervision during the patent application
and prosecution process, but very little supervision after the patent has
been issued. One important limitation under this approach is that practices
that are explicitly required or authorized by the government are immune
whether or not they are supervised.
The Patent Act itself contains several express authorizations that free
the authorized practices from antitrust scrutiny. For example, it authorizes
the patentee to license its patent, including the issuance of exclusive
licenses and even those that are restricted to a territory within the United
States. 81 As a result, a domestic territorial restriction contained in a
production license is not reachable under the antitrust laws. The Patent
Act also explicitly authorizes a patentee, acting unilaterally, to refuse to
license its patent to others.82 As a result, unilateral refusals to license are
not antitrust violations. The Act permits tying, provided that the patentee
does not have market power in the tying product.83
But when a patentee makes use of a patent in a way that the Patent Act
does not authorize, antitrust can be brought to bear. This does not mean
that the presence of a patent issue is irrelevant. Antitrust law is properly
quite sensitive to questions about how patents function in the market and
what the purpose or effects of a particular practice are likely to be. In fact,
here antitrust law has a distinct advantage over patent law, which is largely
indifferent to such questions and has not developed useable litigation tools
for addressing them.84
In this respect antitrust law can be a serious aide to patent law, providing
analysis of patent function and diverse effect that is completely absent
from patent law. The fact is that antitrust law has always tried hard to
accommodate patent law—indeed, over history it has been fairly obsessed
with the issue of making patents fit into its rules about competition. It is

80. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
413 (2004) (Scalia, J., writing for majority).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012).
84. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, supra note 2, at 6; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy 4 (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307141 [http://perma.cc/V8GN-MGJZ].

536

HOVENKAMP PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 515, 2015]

10/20/2015 2:42 PM

Scope of the Patent
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

precisely because antitrust has rules about how markets should perform
that it does so.
By contrast, patent law has never accommodated antitrust concerns or,
for the most part, even considered them relevant. A good recent example
is the Federal Circuit’s decision in Trebro Manufacturing, Inc. v. FireFly
Equipment.85 The patentee was a dominant firm in a market with a small
number of sellers.86 It acquired from an outside inventor a patent on a
technology that was an alternative to the technology it was actually using.87
However, the patentee continued to use its established technology, so the
acquired patent was unused.88 When a competitor entered the market with
a machine that infringed on the dominant firm’s unused patent, the Federal
Circuit allowed an injunction.89 Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s eBay
decision, injunctions for patent infringement are not a matter of right, and
the courts have been generally disinclined to grant injunctions on patents
that are not practiced.90 The Federal Circuit made a distinction in this
case, however. While the patentee was not using the infringed patent, it
was an actual participant in the product market and thus was injured by
the infringement defendant’s entry into the market.91
In Trebro, the Federal Circuit made patent law in complete disregard of
competition policy. Indeed, the amount of harm to competition brought
about by the injunction was substantial. Further, the court’s rule did
nothing to advance innovation because the acquired patent was already
invented before the patentee acquired it. Moreover, its production value
to the acquirer was not even sufficient to induce it to employ the patent’s
technology.92 The only effect of the patent in this case was to remove

85. Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
86. Id. at 1170.
87. See id. at 1171.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). On nonpracticing
entities and general lack of entitlement to an injunction, see Colleen V. Chien & Mark A.
Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–11
(2012); Erik N. Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2477965 [http://perma.cc/7RRY-GVD7].
91. Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. FireFly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
92. Elaborating this point very forcefully is Hovenkamp & Cotter, supra note 90,
at 30.
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technology from the market rather than permit its deployment. Nearly
four decades ago, the Supreme Court held in Brunswick that one cannot
use antitrust law to complain about more, rather than less, competition in
the market.93 That decision fostered a revolution in antitrust that required
plaintiffs to link their theory of harm to the underlying goals of antitrust
law. For patent law, that road is as yet untaken.94
Another example of intellectual property policy making in disregard of
competition policy are several post-Actavis decisions95 concluding that a
pioneer’s promise not to introduce an “authorized generic” into the market
should not be regarded as a qualifying payment for delay.96 While consumers
often distinguish between branded and generic drugs, they typically do
not distinguish between different generics. This makes it possible for a
pioneer to exercise a form of price discrimination that is beneficial to
consumers because it increases overall market output. Of course, it is
generally harmful to the entering generic to the extent that the authorized
generic steals sales. The Effexor decision cited evidence that generic
output if an authorized generic was placed on the market would be about
half of what the generic would have attained if it did not have to compete
with a second generic.97 It also cited evidence that the generic price would

93. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
94. Developing this point is BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 33–59.
95. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *21–*23
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 542–46 (D.N.J. 2014)
(ruling that provision in agreement under which patentee promised not to enter with authorized
generic during 180-day exclusivity period was not a “payment” for delay and thus did not
invoke Actavis doctrine); In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 189–94
(D.R.I. 2014) (holding Actavis applies only to cash payments, which means that promise not
to enter with authorized generic could not be counted); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 565 (D.N.J. 2014) (similar). Contra In re Niaspan
Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (deciding settlement agreement
provision preventing pioneer from entering with authorized generic could be counted together
with other promises in determining existence of large reverse payment); In re Nexium
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 264 (D. Mass. 2014) (similar).
96. The right of the patentee to enter with an authorized generic was recognized in
Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Mylan Pharm.,
Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 271, 275–77 (4th Cir. 2006); and Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v.
Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 53–55 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See Edlin, et al., The Actavis Inference,
supra note 35, at 8; see also David C. Kurlander, Note, Rebalancing Pay-for-Delay: Why
No-Authorized Generic Agreements Should Be Subject to Higher Antitrust Scrutiny, 32
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683, 693–96 (2014) (arguing agreements to refrain from
marketing authorized generics are reverse payments that should be subjected to antitrust
scrutiny). The pioneer patentee’s own generic entry, of course, does not count as an act
of patent infringement triggering the Hatch-Waxman process.
97. See Effexor, 2014 WL 4988410, at *21.
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be about 16% lower if an authorized generic entered into the market.98
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the value of the “no authorized
generic” agreement was so “vague and amorphous” that it could not be
counted as a reverse payment.99 But that is a little like saying that an incipient
cartel or market division agreement cannot be regarded as socially costly
simply because one cannot predict accurately exactly how much harm it
will do. If Actavis makes anything clear, it is that courts need to take more
seriously the anticompetitive consequences of challenged horizontal
agreements.
“No authorized generic” agreements effectively place a second market
exclusion agreement—generic versus generic, for 180 days following generic
entry—on top of the first one, which was at issue in Actavis itself (pioneer
versus generic for the term of the settlement). The outcome is actually far
worse than a large payment for delay. The large payment, which reflects
the extent of the parties’ belief that the patent is invalid, is nothing more
than a wealth transfer between the patentee and the generic. Consumers
are largely unaffected. By contrast, the “no authorized generic” provision
compensates the generic with something far more nefarious—a second
market division that serves to keep prices higher during the 180-day period
when other generic firms are unable to enter the market.
The likely equilibrium resulting from this arrangement is that the parties
will delay the generic’s production for the remaining duration of the
patent, but the generic would have the additional inducement of a further
market exclusion agreement keeping the authorized generic out for 180
days after the independent generic began production. The additional value of
that extra inducement would serve to reduce or eliminate the pay-for
delay reverse payment. For their part, consumers would still feel the full
burden of the pay-for-delay agreement during the time covered by the
settlement up to the day that the generic begins production, but they would
then have the additional burden of lessened competition during the 180
day period of initial generic production.

98. Id. at *3 (citing IMS CONSULTING, IMS HEALTH, ASSESSMENT OF AUTHORIZED
GENERICS IN THE U.S. (2006), http://emmanuelcombe.org/IMS20Authorized20Generics20
Report_6-.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2HH-U5UN]); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED
GENERICS: AN INTERIM REPORT 1–2 (2009), www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P062105authorized
genericsreport.pdf.
99. Effexor, 2014 WL 4988410, at *21.
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VI. APPLYING ANTITRUST’S RULE OF REASON TO PATENT PRACTICES
When a post-issuance patent practice is neither compelled nor expressly
permitted by the patent laws, it should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
This hardly entails that the practice is an antitrust violation or that the
presence of patents is irrelevant, but it does mean that antitrust’s more
empirical, market-focused tools can be brought to bear.
Under antitrust’s rule of reason, the plaintiff must initially show that the
defendant has sufficient market power to affect market competition and
that the challenged practice threatens competition by facilitating either
collusion or anticompetitive exclusion.100 At this point, the burden shifts
to the defendant to provide evidence of a justification or legitimate objective.101
Then the plaintiff has an opportunity to answer that the same objective
could be achieved by a less restrictive alternative.102
This section addresses two issues. First, what is the role of patent
validity or scope in antitrust assessments of licensing agreements? Second,
does the involvement of a patent affect the ordinary antitrust rule of reason
requirements of proof of market power and anticompetitive effects or the
way that presumptions or burdens of proof should be assigned?
A. Analyzing Settlements: When Must a Court Assess
Patent Validity or Infringement?
An often-debilitating problem with the scope of the patent test formulated
as the Actavis dissenters did is that it makes questions about patent validity
or scope essential to the analysis of the challenged practice. In the context
of patent settlements this entails that the very questions that the parties
were seeking to avoid through settlement come right back in. For example,
a pay-for-delay settlement that terminates prior to expiration of the patent
is no more restrictive than a court finding of validity and infringement,
which will exclude the generic from the market in any event. On the other
hand, if the patent is invalid, then delayed entry in exchange for the
payment is a naked restraint. The parties to a patent infringement dispute
settle in order to avoid such difficult questions. But should antitrust analysis

100. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, supra note 2, at 518.
101. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505 (3d
ed. 2010). Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 789 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, at ¶ 1505. For an
example of this approach in a post-Actavis pay-for-delay case, see King Drug Co. of
Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., Nos. 2:06-cv-1797, 2:06-cv-1833, 2:06-cv-2768, 2:08-cv
2141, 2015 WL 356913, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015).
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then require the court to answer this very question in order to determine
legality under the antitrust laws? Recognizing that this is absurd, the
courts typically resort to something far less—holding, for example, that
the settlement will be approved unless the patent is “obviously” invalid or
very weak. With that, close review becomes unnecessary.103
The Actavis majority quite properly observed that courts should be able
to evaluate settlements in at least some cases without addressing issues of
patent validity or infringement.104 This is particularly true when the settlement
is both prima facie anticompetitive and includes a practice that is not
authorized by the Patent Act. Most patent infringement disputes are settled
by license agreements, sometimes accompanied by territorial or field-of
use restrictions.105 Most are thus either explicitly authorized by the Patent
Act and exempt from antitrust scrutiny or else treated under the rule of
reason. Product price fixing and market division in the product market,
as opposed to the licensing market, are not authorized and should be assessed
under ordinary antitrust rules that do not require an assessment of patent
validity or infringement. The fact that these agreements were negotiated
in settlement of a legal dispute is largely irrelevant.
Antitrust assesses the competitiveness of conduct from the time the
conduct occurs. As an economic discipline, it bases its analysis on an ex
ante view of the parties’ objectively reasonable expectations rather than
an ex post view of how the patent validity decision subsequently turns out.
This is consistent with the economic approach to legal analysis generally,
and particularly of litigation settlements, which emphasize rational predictions
rather than ex post results. For example, when business firms negotiate a
contract they make ex ante predictions about how markets will perform.
We do not ordinarily permit them to abrogate the contract later if their
predictions turn out to be incorrect. The relevant competition law question
in a pay-for-delay settlement agreement is what the parties reasonably
knew and expected at the time they entered their agreement, not what
subsequently turned out to be the case.
Requiring a court to analyze an IP settlement by determining whether
the patent is valid and infringed improperly swaps the ex ante and ex post

103. E.g., In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1345 (N.D. Ga.
2012); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
104. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013).
105. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, ¶ 2046.
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perspectives. It also asks the court to do in the antitrust context what the
parties had been unwilling to do for themselves in the context of the patent
litigation. In patent infringement litigation, the appropriate question for
the court is whether the patent is valid and infringed. In an antitrust
challenge to a settlement of such litigation, the correct approach is not to
ask the validity and infringement questions all over again, but rather to
determine what the parties’ reasonable expectations and motivations were
at the time of settlement.106 That is why the Eleventh Circuit was wrong
to describe the antitrust analysis of pay-for-delay patent settlements as
presenting “a turducken task”—one that would involve deciding a patent
case baked inside an antitrust case.107
B. Patent Validity, Scope, or Value: Rational Expectations
If a practice poses a significant competitive threat and is not authorized
by the Patent Act, then its antitrust legality can typically be assessed
without a determination of patent validity or scope. By contrast, if a practice
is expressly authorized by the Patent Act, then the antitrust legality of the
practice may depend on the validity or scope of the patent. For example,
the Patent Act’s authorization of exclusive territorial licenses encompasses
horizontal market division agreements that could be unlawful under the
antitrust laws.108 A patent license in which company A licenses company
B to produce a patented chemical for sale east of the Mississippi River,
while reserving to itself the territory west of the Mississippi, would be
shielded from antitrust scrutiny if the patent were valid and infringed. But
this agreement could be per se unlawful market division if the patent were
known by the parties to be invalid. The relevant antitrust query would be
the parties’ rational expectations at the time the market division license
was negotiated. If the parties reasonably believed at that time that the
patent was valid and covered company B’s product, then a subsequent
finding of patent invalidity should not serve to create antitrust liability for
the agreement up to that point.
As an example of a practice that is not authorized by the Patent Act,
consider patent license agreements that fix product prices as opposed to
license prices. Parties to a patent dispute have a strong motive to engage
in product price fixing, provided that market conditions permit it. The

106. See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 35, at 2.
107. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e
would be deciding a patent case within an antitrust case about the settlement of the patent
case, a turducken task.”), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
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price fix can compensate the patentee with higher returns. Further, the
availability of product price fixing gives the parties to an infringement
dispute a highly favorable joint maximizing position that serves to limit
adversity between them. If the price fix lasts no longer than the duration
of the patent, then at first glance it might seem to be no more harmful to
customers than a patentee’s simple solo production under its patent, which
will also produce the monopoly price. As a result, a product price fix of
limited duration passes the scope of the patent test.
On the other hand, while license prices have to be determined by the
parties, product prices do not. Nothing in the Patent Act authorizes product
price fixing. A product price fix contained in a patent license agreement
might be a cover for a dubious patent, as Judge Posner suggested in the
Asahi Glass case.109 Firms wishing to fix product prices might identify
some relatively weak or useless patent and then place the price fix into a
license agreement. But assessing such an agreement would require an
inquiry into patent validity or strength.
In most cases the validity question is the wrong one, however. The
competitive consequences of product price fixing through a patent license
has much less to do with patent validity than with patent value. An invalid
patent certainly has no value once it has been established as invalid. But
many perfectly valid patents have little value for the simple reason that they
add little to a licensee’s technology or alternative patents or technological
routes are available that serve the same purpose.
As an empirical matter, patents are worth much less than the value of
cartel formation. An assortment of studies suggest that cartel markups in
industries prone to collusion run in the range of 20% to 50% over the pre
cartel price.110 By contrast, average royalty rates on licensed patents run

109. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (Posner, J., sitting by designation).
110. See Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde, The Effect of Explicit Communication on
Pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel, 62 J. INDUS. ECON. 191, 219
(2014); John M. Connor, Cartel Overcharges, in 26 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS,
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS 249 (James Langenfeld ed., 2014); John M.
Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990
2005, at 21 (Purdue Univ. Dep’t of Agric. Econ., Working Paper No. 06-11, 2006),
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/working_papers/workingpaper.connor.11.10.06.pdf [http://
perma.cc/J3T3-ZSPM]; Florian Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of
EU Competition Law 6–9 (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 12-050,
2012), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12050.pdf [http://perma.cc/W6DT-GYU2].
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in a range of 0.5% to 6% of the wholesale product price.111 One study
found the median rate to be about 3%.112 In patent-rich technologies such
as electronic devices royalty rates can be much less, simply because there
are so many patents.113 Significantly, licensed patents that are subject to
these royalty rates are assumed to be valid and also practiced—infringed—
by the licensees. Further, only a small percentage of patents are licensed—
as few as 3-4% by some estimates—and these patents are generally regarded
as more valuable than the vast majority that are not licensed.114
A rule invalidating a product price fix only if the patent is likely to be
invalid does not adequately address the problem these facts expose. Even
a valid patent is likely to claim a royalty that is much smaller than the
typical returns to product price fixing. When that is the case, the parties
are attributing to the patent the entire monopoly markup value of a cartel
in the same market—a value that is rarely conferred by even relatively
strong patents.
These facts suggest, first, that the markup resulting from product price
fixing can be much greater than the returns to patent licensing alone, even
if we assume that the patents in question are valid and infringed. Consumer
harm is proportionately greater as well. Second, in the settlement context
a judicial determination of patent validity is not adequate for assessing this
problem. The patent could be perfectly valid but worth very little to the
licensee, or at least worth only a small fraction of the markup contained
in the product price fix.
In order to determine the harmfulness of such a price fix, we would have
to establish the excess of the cartel markup over the patent’s appropriate
royalty rate. This means an inquiry into validity, infringement, and licensing
value. Answering these questions is likely to be monumentally difficult.

111. KPMG INT’L, PROFITABILITY AND ROYALTY RATES ACROSS INDUSTRIES 8 (2012),
https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents
/gvi-profitability-v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ2V-XFQG] (finding actual royalty rates in
the range of 2.6% to 3.6%); see also Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, supra
note 2 at 526 (discussing other literature).
112. Mariko Sakakibara, An Empirical Analysis of Pricing in Patent Licensing
Contracts 12 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the UCLA Anderson
Graduate School of Management), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1515163.
113. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (noting plaintiff’s testimony employing 1% of device as reasonable royalty; court
affirming findings of validity and infringement and accepting the 1% royalty figure but
disputing the base).
114. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001).
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A serious antitrust assessment of a product price fix contained in a settlement
agreement would be even more complex than the patent infringement suit
that was settled. That lawsuit would address questions of validity and
infringement, but not of patent value.
But the availability of a less restrictive alternative enables the tribunal
to avoid more difficult inquiries. Questions about patent validity, scope,
and market value can be completely discounted into a patent license
agreement that sets the terms of the license fee, without specifying
anything about the product price. If the patent is likely to be invalid, or
not infringed, or if it is not valuable to the licensee because reasonable
alternatives exist, then the licensee will not pay very much for the license.
By contrast, if the patent scores high on all these points, the outcome will
be reflected in a higher license fee. With respect to the license fee itself,
the parties have complete adversity across all three elements of patent
validity, infringement, and value. The licensee wants a lower fee and the
patentee wants a higher one. This is in sharp contrast to the product price
fix, where the parties share in the cartel markup.
Rule of reason analysis of pay-for-delay settlements is similar. In a payfor-delay settlement agreement such as the one the Supreme Court
assessed in Actavis, the parties bargained along two important vectors,
including the generic entry date and the size of the payment from the
pioneer to the generic. The entry date establishes the size of the monopoly
pie, and the size of the payment represents how the pie is to be divided
up. Being able to bargain along these two vectors simultaneously enables
the parties to select an entry date as remote as the antitrust authorities will
accept, thus maximizing the overall size of the gains.115 Then they can
bargain over the size of the payment in order to resolve issues about patent
validity, risk aversion, and anticipated litigation costs. The parties do not
have significant adversity on the question of entry date: the longer they
delay, the better for them, provided that they keep the entry date short of
patent expiration. They do have adversity over the size and terms of the
payment, with weaker patents resulting in higher payments to the generic.
Even if the two parties privately conceded that the patent is completely
worthless, they would still have every incentive to bargain for the remote
entry date, but the generic would insist on a very high pay-for-delay price.

115. See discussion supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text on the entry date
under a scope of the patent durational formulation.
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Under the scope of the patent formulation, the equilibrium entry date
would be the patent expiration date, and consumers would be heavy
losers, no matter the strength of the patent.
In this case, a less restrictive alternative is available as well: we can
permit the parties to bargain over the entry date, but without a side payment
or any other value transfer. Such a bargain provides all of the value that
the parties are entitled to, but without the additional consumer harm
caused by an unnecessarily anticompetitive agreement. The parties are
still able to consider patent strength, anticipated litigation costs, and degree
of risk aversion. If the parties believe that the patent is strong, the outcome
may still be one that sets a generic entry date relatively close to the
expiration of the patent, but in that case, considerations of patent strength
will have determined the duration of the agreement rather than joint
maximization of a monopoly profit stream without regard to patent
strength. If the parties believe that the patent is weak, they can bargain
for an early entry date, or else the generic will refuse to bargain and litigate
to the end. By the same token, if the patentee believes that its patent is
valid but is risk-averse, it can trade away uncertainty over the litigation
outcome against the certainty of an assured entry date. The parties can
also take reasonably anticipated litigation costs and duration into effect,
although the Actavis decision permits a payment sufficient to cover
expected litigation costs in any event.116
C. Are Anticompetitive Practices Appropriate Returns to Patenting?
Product price fixing in patent licenses and pay-for-delay settlements of
pharmaceutical patent disputes both serve to increase the returns to patents.
By contrast, antitrust rules limiting these practices serve to reduce those
returns. One argument against antitrust rules of this sort is that by reducing
the returns to patenting they also reduce the incentive to innovate.117 For
example, if a patent could reasonably claim a royalty of 3%, but a product
cartel of that patent’s users could exact a 25% markup, then the returns to
that patent are higher under product price fixing and there would be more
incentive to innovate.
Patents are tradable goods, and the price a buyer is willing to pay
presumptively reflects a patent’s value to that buyer. Product price fixing

116. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (citing “avoided litigation
costs” as legitimate grounds for settlement).
117. See Diane E. Bieri, Implications of FTC v. Actavis: A Reasonable Approach to
Evaluating Reverse Payment Settlements, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 135, 142–43 (2014)
(describing the challenges innovative drug companies face settling Hatch-Waxman litigation).
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cartels obtain high royalties by giving the patent an effective value equal
to the entire monopoly markup for that particular product. If a patent
would command a royalty of 3% but yields a 25% product overcharge
when licensed along with a product price fix, then this particular patent is
commanding much more than its market-determined innovation value.
Overvalued patents can cause just as much deadweight loss as undervalued
ones.
The relevant policies to be applied here are identical to those we use for
traditional nonintellectual property interests. For example, the production
value of a plant might be $3 million in a competitive market but $5 million
in a cartelized market. But antitrust law does not permit people to organize
cartels in order to obtain a larger return on their property, even if the larger
return increases incentives to acquire or develop the property in the first
place.
Economically, the pay-for-delay settlement operates in much the same
way as the product price fix, permitting the parties to obtain the full cartel
value until the settlement terminates. The outcome is about the same as
one in which the generic entered but the pioneer and generic then fixed
product prices. The price charged by the single pioneer without competition
would be the same as that charged by a perfectly functioning, two-firm
cartel.118 In the pay-for-delay case, the principal gains to the patentee result
from the settlement’s lengthening of the effective patent term, prolonging
this cartel outcome. Most large pay-for-delay settlements involve extension,
or secondary, patents rather than original primary molecules. The failure
rate on these extension patents is far higher than on pioneer molecule
patents,119 but Hatch-Waxman gives the parties the same protection that
would occur if the patent were ironclad.

118. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 33, § 4.1.
119. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339
SCI. 1386, 1387 (2013) (finding 89% of large pay-for-delay settlements involved secondary
drugs); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY 13 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/genericdrug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (concluding that 1/4
of litigated patents in Hatch-Waxman challenges are valid); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The
Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348–
49 (2007); Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s
Actavis Decision, supra note 30, at 11 (reporting an invalidity rate of about two-thirds in
fully litigated Hatch-Waxman challenges).
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Is a pay-for-delay patent extension of this sort a reasonable return to
patenting? While longer patent terms are worth more than shorter ones,
the difference is less than one might think. Landes and Posner concluded
that, measured ex ante, the value of a 20-year patent is roughly 85% of
that of an infinitely long patent.120 Once they calculate in an estimate for
market depreciation, the number is closer to 95%.121 The depreciation
number is important. While the quality of a patented drug does not change
over the patent’s term, the number and quality of its competitors is likely
to increase. A blockbuster drug that has no good alternatives when first
patented may have a half-dozen differentiated substitutes within a few
years. These alternatives are not generics, which would be patent infringers,
but drugs that use different compounds to treat similar conditions. Other
things being equal, the patent becomes less valuable over time even without
bioequivalent generic entry.122
Most importantly for antitrust purposes, the Patent Act itself regulates
patent value by defining the length of the term and also by metering patent
scope. Beyond that there is no good reason for treating patent practices
that are not authorized by the Patent Act any differently than the law treats
other kinds of property. The argument that restraining price-fixing,
horizontal product market division, or boycotts can increase the returns
to patenting proves far too much. Cartels can increase the rate of return
to all types of productive property, hardly limited to intellectual property.
But the law’s authorization to own and transact in property does not carry
by implication the right to do so anticompetitively.123 Nor is there any
such general authorization in the Patent Act. If pharmaceutical patents
require a longer term of protection in order to make investment in new
drugs profitable, that is an issue for Congress.

120. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 296 (2003).
121. Id. at 297.
122. See Stephane Régnier, What Is the Value of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs?, 16 HEALTH CARE
MGMT. SCI. 300, 304–07 (2013); Peter Arcidiacono et al., Pharmaceutical Followers, 31
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 538, 539, 550–52 (2013); see also Lars Olbe, et al., A Proton-Pump
Inhibitor Expedition: The Case Histories of Omeprazole and Esomeprazole, 2 NATURE
REVIEWS 132, 132 (2003), http://faculty.missouri.edu/~gatesk/Prilosec.pdf [http://perma.
cc/6SFH-G3Q9] (developing history of one family of similar but not bioequivalent drugs).
But see Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is Too
Many?, 305 JAMA 711, 711 (2011) (stating newly approved similar drugs are higher
priced and heavily marketed).
123. The Supreme Court made this clear in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (2013) (holding state statute that authorized one corporation to
acquire another did not implicitly authorize an anticompetitive acquisition).
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D. Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and the Rule of Reason
Actavis held that the rule of reason should be applied to a pay-for-delay
patent infringement settlement on the facts of that case.124 In so doing it
rejected alternatives suggesting that pay-for-delay settlements should be
legal per se if they fall within the scope of the patent or are assessed under
a quick look analysis as the FTC had urged.
The Court’s insistence on a rule of reason reflects its antipathy toward
quick look analysis. It also tracks the approach taken in the Antitrust Law
treatise that prefers to think of the mode of antitrust analysis as a “sliding
scale,” composed of varying presumptions.125 Rather than placing antitrust
analysis into three silos dominated “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of
reason,” it is better to think of the problem as setting proof requirements
that vary with the circumstances. The less factually plausible a party’s case,
the greater its burden should be. Proof burdens also shift with the availability
of evidence.
By contrast, the quick look analysis that the Actavis Court envisioned
and ultimately rejected began with a presumption of per se illegality,
which could be defeated if the defendant could “show empirical evidence
of procompetitive effects.”126 By rejecting that approach, the Court was
hardly eliminating the use of presumptions in antitrust litigation under the
rule of reason. To the contrary, the rule of reason contains far more
presumptions than the per se rule or any alternative truncated approach.
These presumptions are ubiquitous and an essential part of rule of reason
analysis.127 For example, courts sometimes say that a high market share
creates a presumption of market power, but this presumption can be defeated
by evidence of low entry barriers or rivals who can readily expand their
output.128 Alternatively, in exclusive dealing cases under the rule of reason,

124.
125.

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
See id. at 2237–38 (quoting a previous edition of 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507 (1986) (cited in Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999))).
126. Id. at 2237 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 775 n.12).
127. On the use of presumptions under the rule of reason, see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, ¶ 1507; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14–17 (1984) (discussing the importance of presumptions in
rule of reason cases).
128. E.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 n.10 (9th Cir.
1995); FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *20,
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the courts presume competitive harm from contracts of long duration or
presume lack of harm from shorter-term contracts.129 Historically, the courts
presumed market power if a tying product was patented, but that is no
longer the case.130
The Actavis majority also suggested presumptions such as these would
apply in any rule of reason case. For example, “[a]n unexplained large
reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious
doubts about the patent’s survival.”131 The Court added that “[t]he size of
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration”
of the validity of the patent itself.132 The term unexplained means that the
Court was creating a presumption: a large payment requires an explanation,
obligating the defendant to produce something that justifies the payment
insofar as it exceeds anticipated litigation costs.133 At least one decision
has indicated that the burden of proving a large payment is on the plaintiff
or government. Once that burden is met, then the burden to show that the
payment is “explained” or “justified” should be on the defendants, who
hold the evidence relevant to that question.134
The Supreme Court also indicated that the size of a reverse payment is
a “strong indicator” of market power,135 but later suggested that a large
payment might partly reflect compensation for other services that would

*46 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011); see also Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp.
2d 323, 340 (D. Vt. 2010) (noting that market shares are given “weight and not
conclusiveness” (quoting Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir.
1998))).
129. E.g., Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1997).
130. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40 (2006).
131. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
132. Id. at 2236–37 (citing 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, ¶ 2046).
133. On the relevance of litigation costs, see id. at 2236.
134. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-1797, 2015 WL
356913, at *1, *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015):
Plaintiffs must present evidence of a large reverse payment as part of their initial
burden of demonstrating anticompetitive effects under the rule of reason . . . .
[I]f Plaintiffs meet this standard, the burden shifts to Defendants to justify the
reverse payment as procompetitive.
....
. . . Synthesizing this precedent with the Court’s statements in Actavis, I find
that whether or not the reverse payment is unjustified or unexplained is
examined under the standard rule of reason burden-shifting framework, with the
defendant bearing the burden of providing evidence that the reverse payment is
justified by procompetitive considerations.
135. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting 12 PHILLIP A. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046).

550

HOVENKAMP PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 515, 2015]

10/20/2015 2:42 PM

Scope of the Patent
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

serve to weaken that inference.136 The traditional presumption used in
antitrust analysis relates market power to share of a properly defined
relevant market. However, that presumption can be defeated or weakened
by evidence of low entry barriers, market instability, or rival or customer
mobility.137 Market power can also be measured “directly,” typically by
technical tools that assess residual demand or price–cost margins.138 A
large payment is a rational act only if the payer has price cost margins
worth protecting. More specifically, the payer’s willingness to pay will
be limited by the anticipated price–cost margins of exclusive sales over
the remaining life of the settlement. If price–cost margins were zero, then
the seller would be unwilling to pay anything. So to the extent high
margins indicate power, the high payment is a good presumptive signal.
One possible objection is that high price–cost margins reflect only variable
costs. A firm may have high margins but still not be able to recover its
fixed cost investment, making the product unprofitable over its lifecycle.
While that might be factually true, it is not ordinarily relevant to power
assessments in antitrust cases. All of our direct measures for assessing
power focus exclusively or heavily on variable costs. For example, the
Lerner Index and its variations measure market power by looking to
margins between short-run marginal cost and price, and the impact of changes
in demand. All of these are variable cost measures.139 Even market share
measures the extent to which the firm responds to changes in demand or
short-run costs. The market power question for antitrust purposes is not
whether a firm is earning enough to cover its fixed costs, but whether it
has the ability to profit by reducing market output and raising price. So
inferring power from a large pay-for-delay settlement is not different in
principle from inferring power from other types of evidence more
conventionally used to estimate market power. Finally, the critique from
fixed costs confuses the power issue and the liability issue. On the one
hand, we do not want to punish firms for having high fixed costs and the

136. Id. at 2237.
137. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591
n.15 (1986) (“[Y]et without barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to
maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.”).
138. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 515,
521 (4th ed. 2014); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437–
43 (2010).
139. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 33, § 3.1a.
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high margins that ordinarily accompany them. On the other, they are clearly
relevant to a determination of whether the firm is capable of profiting from
an anticompetitive act.140
In any event, the Actavis Court was not inferring power simply from
high price–cost margins but from an exclusion payment. Particularly, in
intellectual property markets, products are sold under at least moderately
competitive conditions and yet have high margins.141 For example, an app
store that sells software for an electronic device such as an iPad or Kindle
may offer many product alternatives that have very low variable costs of
distribution, sometimes approaching zero. The same thing is true of electronic
books and streamed movies or digital music. Any price represents a
significant short-run price–cost margin, but these products may not even
be able to recover fixed investment costs over their product lives.
Very high exclusion payments are a different matter. A manufacturer
with large fixed costs and high margins would not agree to make a large
payment if it could not anticipate being able to recoup this investment
over the duration of the settlement. The issue here is similar to the one
used for analyzing “recoupment” in predatory pricing cases. Namely, a
firm will invest in a strategy if the reasonably anticipated payoff exceeds
the reasonably anticipated investment.142 Presumably, one of a dozen
manufacturers of notepad apps for an iPad would not pay large amounts
to a different app manufacturer to withdraw from the market. The market
is competitive, and the removal of one supplier would not make much
difference. In sum, the absence of competition from other firms is what
makes a payoff to one firm a rational act.
In any event, the argument from high fixed costs proves too much. A
firm with high fixed costs might be able to stay profitable—or earn greater
profits—if it has a monopoly, but unless constrained, it will produce at the
monopoly level. For example, a firm with high fixed costs might maximize
its profits by producing 1000 units. The competitive market output in this
industry—producing a return just large enough to maintain investment—
might be 2000 units. Permitting collusion would take us to the 1000 unit
outcome. That is why the Supreme Court was correct to reject “ruinous
competition” defenses to collusion in industries with high fixed costs.143
Competitors with high fixed costs may have a motive to fix prices, but

140. See Kaplow, supra note 138, at 500.
141. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 138, ¶¶ 516g, 518e2–3.
142. On the recoupment requirement in predatory pricing, see 3A PHILIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 726–27.
143. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 329–30 (1897).
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when they do, they can be expected to set prices at the cartel level, not at
the level just sufficient to provide competitive returns.
VII. CONCLUSION
Applying the rule of reason to antitrust claims involving patent
licensing and related practices has been made unnecessarily difficult by
the scope of the patent rule. First, identifying practices that fall within
and without the scope of the patent yields indeterminate results, particularly
when vertical integration is available to place certain uses inside the firm.
Second, many settlements, including both product price restraints and
payment-for-delay, can be properly assessed under this rule only by judicial
determination of patent validity, infringement, and in many cases market
value. This makes a full-scale evaluation even more difficult than the
assessment made in a patent infringement lawsuit, which ordinarily inquires
only into validity and infringement. In any event, the antitrust approach
to restraints requires examining them as of the time they occur, taking the
parties’ reasonable expectations into account. An ex post inquiry into
patent validity is not helpful except insofar as it informs what the parties’
rational expectations must have been.
A better pair of rules divides patent practices into pre- and post-issuance,
generally immunizing the former from antitrust scrutiny. Post-issuance
practices must then be divided into those that are authorized by the Patent
Act and those that are not. A post-issuance practice that is not authorized
by the Patent Act should ordinarily be subject to antitrust review. In his
Actavis dissent, Chief Justice Roberts observed that “patent policy
encompasses a set of judgments about the proper tradeoff between
competition and the incentive to innovate over the long run. Antitrust’s
rule of reason was not designed for such judgments and is not adept at
making them.”144 True enough, but the Chief Justice did not point to any
place where patent policy had made these particular judgments either.
They are neither in the language of the statute nor its legislative history.
While antitrust policy is not particularly adept at trading off short- and
long-run judgments when there is something to trade off, in this case there
is not. The short-run competitive harm from these settlements has been

144. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2246 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 1 HOVENKAMP
et al., IP AND ANTITRUST § 7.3 (2d ed. 2010)).
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empirically evaluated over and over. On the long run, “incentive to innovate”
side of the scale there is nothing in the patent statute and precious little in
the economic literature. The one relevant thing that we have is Congress’s
clear interest, expressed in the Hatch-Waxman Act, to encourage generic
entry.
While the antitrust decision maker must be circumspect about assessing
the competitive and innovation effects of challenged practices, these
assessments largely involve questions of antitrust law, not of patent law.
Outside of damages measurement, patent law has no tool kit for assessing
either the market or even the innovation effects of a particular practice.
While that criticism may seem harsh, the reality is that patent law has
developed in relative isolation from any significant inquiry into how
patents function in the marketplace. The result gives antitrust policy a
comparative advantage, not only for assessing competition effects but
ironically, even for assessing innovation effects.
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